

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY**

DURAN WILLIAMS,	:	Civil No. 10-3341 (DMC)
Plaintiff,	:	
v.	:	
R. DAY MONTILEON,	:	
Defendants.	:	

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

DURAN WILLIAMS, #228179
Hudson County Correctional Center, C-500-East
35 Hackensack Avenue
Kearny, NJ 07032

CAVANAUGH, District Judge:

Duran Williams, an inmate at Hudson County Correctional Center (“HCCC”), seeks to file a Complaint against R. Day Montileon, Caption of Plaintiff’s tier at HCCC, for refusal of religious services and religious diet. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). This Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and collect the \$350 filing fee by directing the Warden of HCCC to deduct installment payments in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). This Court has screened the Complaint for dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A and, for the reasons explained below, will dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint within 30 days.

I. BACKGROUND

Using a prisoner civil rights complaint form, Plaintiff asserts the following facts in his statement of claims:

On a number of times d[eni]ed religio[us] services & religio[us] diet. Has been bias[ed] against me because of crime. Captain Day & Lt. Montileone I have wrote remedies to on a number of times about situations and have never gotten a answer or copy of remedies back. 1st & 8th Amendment has been infringed upon.

(Docket Entry #1, p. 6.)

For violation of his constitutional rights, Plaintiff seeks: "Get religion services. Get paid for pain & suffering & weight loss due to not receiving my food and mental stress taking medication now, due to bias situation." (Docket Entry #1, p. 7.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), hammered the "final nail-in-the-coffin" for the "no set of facts" standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),¹ which was previously applied to determine if a federal complaint stated a claim. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009). The pleading standard under Rule 8 was refined by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), where the Supreme Court clarified as follows:

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

¹ The Conley court held that a district court was permitted to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only if "it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at 45-46.

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not “show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 -1950 (citations omitted).

Since Iqbal, the Third Circuit has required district courts to conduct a three-part analysis when reviewing a complaint for dismissal for failure to state a claim:

To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under the [Iqbal] pleading regime . . . , a court must take three steps: First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.

Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F. 3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote omitted).

The Court is mindful that the sufficiency of this pro se pleading must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff, even after Iqbal. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).

III. DISCUSSION

A court's initial task is to "tak[e] note of the elements [Plaintiff] must plead" in order to state a claim of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Iqbal, 129 S Ct. at 1947-48. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two elements: (1) a person deprived him or caused him to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

In this case, without describing what the parties actually did, or even stating what his religion is or what his religious beliefs require, Plaintiff concludes that Captain Day and Lt. Montileone denied him an unspecified religious diet and unspecified religious services. This Court construes Plaintiff's allegations as an attempt to assert a Free Exercise Clause claim under the First Amendment and § 1983. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ." U.S. Const. amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits prison officials from denying an inmate "a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith." See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 & n.2 (1972). However, the mere assertion of denial of religious services does

automatically trigger violation of the Free Exercise Clause in the prison context. If a prisoner's request is "not the result of sincerely held religious beliefs, the First Amendment imposes no obligation on the prison to honor that request." See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F. 3d 236, 250 (quoting DeHart v. Horn, 227 F. 3d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 2000)). Secular views are not protected by the Free Exercise Clause, and "[o]nly beliefs which are both sincerely held and religious in nature are protected under the First Amendment." Sutton, 323 F. 3d at 251 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, to state a claim, the fact alleged must show that a prisoner's request for religious services or diet is based on his own sincerely held religious belief. Id.

Even where religious beliefs are sincerely held, "the constitutional rights that prisoners possess are more limited in scope than the constitutional rights held by individuals in society at large." Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1987)). Although "prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections," it is settled that "[t]he fact of confinement as well as the legitimate goals and policies of the penal institution limits these retained constitutional rights." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 526, 546 (1979). Moreover, in deciding an inmate's First Amendment challenge, a court must recognize that "judgments regarding prison security 'are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.'" Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 86 (1987) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)). Prison administrators, "who are actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular institution under examination" are the best arbiters of the need for specific prison regulations to maintain institutional safety and promote prisoner

rehabilitation. Bell, 441 U.S. at 562; see also Pell, 417 U.S. at 827 (courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment unless officials exaggerate the legitimacy of the interest behind the regulation). To guarantee due deference is shown to prison officials, courts examine the constitutionality of prison regulations using a reasonableness standard set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, (1987). “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 482 U.S. at 89. Turner requires courts to weigh four factors in determining reasonableness: “whether the regulation has a ‘valid, rational connection’ to a legitimate governmental interest; whether alternative means are open to inmates to exercise the asserted right; what impact an accommodation of the right would have on guards and inmates and prison resources; and whether there are any ‘ready alternatives’ to the regulation.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91); see also Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2002). Furthermore, “the burden is not on the state to prove the validity of the challenged prison regulation but instead is on the inmate to disprove it.” Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003)).

For example, In O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), Muslim inmates challenged a New Jersey classification regulation which prohibited inmates assigned to outside work details from returning to the prison during the day except in the case of an emergency on Free Exercise grounds because it prevented Muslims assigned to outside work details from attending Juma services on Fridays. The Supreme Court rejected the Free Exercise claim, deferring to the determination of prison administrators that a rule preventing inmates from returning from outside work details was rationally related to security and rehabilitative concerns relating to work:


There are, of course, no alternative means of attending Jumu'ah; respondents' religious beliefs insist that it occur at a particular time. But the very stringent requirements as to the time at which Jumu'ah may be held may make it extraordinarily difficult for prison officials to assure that every Muslim prisoner is able to attend that service. While we in no way minimize the central importance of Jumu'ah to respondents, we are unwilling to hold that prison officials are required by the Constitution to sacrifice legitimate penological objectives to that end.

Id. at 351-52; see also Fraise v. Terhune, 383 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting inmates' free exercise challenge to regulation designating Five Percent Nation as a security threat group and directing members' confinement in a security threat group unit); Williams, 343 F.3d at 218 (rejecting prisoners' free exercise claim because "providing vegetarian meals, rather than Halal meals . . . , is rationally related to the legitimate penological interests in simplified food service, security, and staying within the prison's budget").

The problem with Plaintiff's Complaint here is that he provides only conclusions and no facts. He does not assert facts showing that he has any sincerely held religious beliefs, and he does not assert facts showing how, when and under what circumstances defendants interfered with his exercise of his religious beliefs. Because the Complaint does not set forth any non-conclusory allegations establishing that defendants are liable for violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment in the context of a jail, this Court will dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1983. However, because Plaintiff may be able to remedy the factual deficiencies by filing an amended complaint which sets forth non-conclusory facts satisfying the Iqbal standard and showing how defendants violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause, this Court will grant Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint that is complete on its face.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will grant Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the Complaint without prejudice.


DENNIS M. CAVANAUGH U.S.D.J.

Dated: 5/20, 2011